One of the more important innovations in the study of how citizens assess the U.S. Supreme
institution (with greater distance implying greater dissatisfaction). Their model assumes that citizens learn about court decisions; they then encode them on a unidimensional liberalconservative continuum; one on which they have already located themselves; thus making the calculation of the ideological distance between the citizen and institution possible. New Court decisions stimulate the recalculation of the ideological distance. If distance increases, dissatisfaction rises, and support is withdrawn. If distance decreases, additional support is provided. According to this model, policy is important not in and of itself but rather because it provides information about the Supreme Court's ideological location. The fundamental process of evaluating the Court is therefore encased in an ideological framework.
This ideological model of evaluation places great demands on the American people. One must have an ideology; perceive the Court in ideological terms and understand its ideological location; judge policies by ideological criteria; hold attitudes toward the institution; and update those attitudes continuously. Moreover, this process is especially difficult and confusing in a context in which the Court's decisions are roughly one-half conservative and one-half liberal (Bartels and Johnston 2013) . It may well be that scholars judge the Supreme Court according to this model; but that ordinary people do so runs deeply counter to a long tradition in political science suggesting that Americans are largely "innocent of ideology" (Converse 1964 ).
Indeed, even the simple model of policy evaluation and updating makes a number of heroic assumptions that few students of political communication would accept. Althaus et al. (2011 Althaus et al. ( , 1065 , for example, are particularly critical of such simplistic models, complaining that: "Political science scholarship that touches on public opinion processes often assumes that social, -3-political, and economic facts are routinely transmitted to the mass public, presumably through mainstream media channels." In fact, according to these authors, that is not so.
The importance of studying and describing these information flows is little appreciated within our field. Their continued neglect calls into question a wide range of theories about system-and individual-level processes rooted in the unlikely assumption that the observable facts serving as inputs to our models are communicated widely enough through a political system that they could serve as a proximal influence on individual-level opinions. (Althaus et al. 2011 (Althaus et al. , 1077 emphasis added)
The very first step in every model of updating -that citizens learn of, understand, and evaluate the outputs of the U.S. Supreme Court -seems suspect from the viewpoint of scholars like Althaus and his colleagues.
Our purpose in this paper is specifically to investigate the assumptions of the ideological updating model, with an eye toward determining whether many of the American people -indeed, even whether a majority of the American people -update their Supreme Court views via the process envisaged by advocates of this new ideologically grounded model. We do so in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling on Obamacare. Based on an analysis of this highly salient Court decision 2 -the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) -our overall conclusion is that few Americans can update their views of the Court in the presumed fashion. In the end, we suggest that the "rule, learn, update" model of change in Supreme Court attitudes is much too demanding of the American people and therefore that it can claim little empirical support for its basic assumptions about the mechanisms involved in updating attitudes toward the U.S. Supreme Court.
Learning About Supreme Court Opinions and Legitimacy Theory
There can be little debate over the proposition that most Supreme Court decisions have no effect on the Court's legitimacy because the mass public never learns that the Court has ruled. Much of 2 For example, Johnston, Hillygus, and Bartels (2014, 963) slightly more general approach is to consider overall satisfaction with the body of rulings by the Court -which is often termed "specific support" (see Easton 1975) . However, Bartels and
Johnston have moved even a step further by focusing on ideological dissatisfaction, which is the distance between the citizen's own ideological position and her perception of the ideological position of the Court (see also Bartels, Johnston, and Mark 2015) . In doing so, these authors have complicated the communication model considerably, understanding it not simply as based on policy satisfaction and dissatisfaction but rather as enveloped in a demanding process of ideological assessment and calculations of ideological distance. Christenson and Glick (2015) also investigated the effects of the Supreme Court's decision on Obamacare on the institution's legitimacy, searching in particular for possible -6-consequences of ideological disagreement with the Court and of the switch in vote by Chief Justice Roberts from finding the law unconstitutional to judging it constitutional. Following Bartels and Johnston, the basic hypotheses of their research are that citizens use the Court's ruling to reassess the ideological location of the institution, and also that the American people see Roberts' actions as strategic and politicized behavior, thereby undermining the view that the Court is not an ordinary political institution (which is an assumed bedrock belief of institutional legitimacy).
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Christenson and Glick conclude that "the decision provides new information that people can use to update their assessments of the Court's ideology, and that these updates affect assessments of legitimacy" (Christenson and Glick 2015, 414, emphasis added) . According to the authors, it is not so much disagreement with the policy that is important to citizens, but is rather what the decision reveals about the overall ideological position of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Ideological distance from the Court is crucial, the researchers claim, to determining whether to extend legitimacy to the institution. Johnston, Hillygus, and Bartels (2014) posit a similarly complicated model in which political sophistication plays a key moderating role in the model of ideological updating. 3 We are little concerned with addressing the consequences of strategic behavior for institutional legitimacy, in part because some of their empirical findings run contrary to their expectations, requiring post-hoc explanations that are not entirely persuasive (e.g., in some circumstances, the Roberts strategic treatment actually increased support for the Court -p. 411).
Following Zaller (1992) , they argue that updating requires both awareness of the decision and legitimacy attitudes that are sufficiently weak that they are susceptible to change. They report that their ideological updating model seems to pertain most to those with relatively uncrystallized attitudes toward the Court, but who knew about the Obamacare ruling. We suspect that this is a fairly small part of the total population (although it is not possible from their published material to determine exactly what portions of their respondents fall into which categories). Still, for at least some people, ideological updating drives institutional support.
Thus, an important modification has been offered to conventional theories about how citizens evaluate the U.S. Supreme Court. Instead of simply reacting to the Court's policy outputs, citizens are assumed to use Court decisions to infer whether and how the ideology of the Court has changed. This process of awarding legitimacy to the institution is thus highly dependent upon citizens being able to learn about Court decisions and to make these ideological reassessments.
The Micro-Mechanics of the Ideological Updating Model
There are quite a number of moving parts in this ideological updating model, especially in contrast to a simple policy agreement/disagreement model. In the latter, citizens are thought to perceive a ruling and determine whether they agree or disagree with it by comparing the Court's policy with the citizen's own policy preference. This is a classic "running tally" mechanism of specific support (Gibson and Nelson 2015a (Nelson and Gibson 2016; Gibson and Nelson 2015a ).
Thus, current research on legitimacy updating seems to rely upon an unrealistically complicated and quite incomplete model of public opinion.
More generally, the ideological framework of this model seems incompatible with an extensive body of research on public opinion concluding that many Americans are largely innocent of ideology. The original statement of this position is Converse's (1964) "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." According to Converse, most citizens are not politically 5 According to the measure of legal realism used by Christenson and Glick (2015, 414) , 52% of their sample views the Court as a primarily legal institution.
-10-sophisticated; they do not conceptualize politics through the lens of ideology, and are frequently unable to interpret the socio-political connotations of ideological concepts. Only a small portion of the American electorate is classified in the high sophistication, ideologically minded stratum.
Less politically and informationally sophisticated citizens may rely on "more obviously recognizable social groupings" such as partisan identification, or immediate experiences such as "family, job, and immediate associates" to form political preferences (Converse 1964, 213) .
Citizens who are even less sophisticated utilize easily accessible, established cues such as following current trends (the "nature of the times") or group interests in a haphazard attempt to form policy preferences (Zaller 1992) . Since each political opinion stems from disparate experiences, low sophisticates have a more difficult time reconciling their political attitudes under a singular ideology and therefore exhibit more compartmentalized opinions. If citizens are able to form policy opinions, most do so without a fundamental ideological foundation that informs their general preferences toward a wide array of policies (Kinder 1983 ).
On the other hand, a revisionist school has emerged that asserts that ideology does play some role in the formation of political opinions for typical citizens. From this perspective, scholars claim that the initial sentiment that citizens are devoid of ideological thinking "was too extreme and that people generally do think, feel, and behave in ideologically meaningful ways, even if they are not perfectly articulate about their ideological proclivities" (Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008, 127) .
Still, key components of the ideological story remain unresolved, such as whether ideology can be appropriately captured in a unidimensional model (Feldman and Johnston -11-2014 liberal along a social dimension. When forced to place themselves on a singular ideological continuum, these citizens are likely "to self-identify as moderate (or say 'Don't Know') in response to the standard liberal-conservative scale" (Treier and Hillygus 2009, 680) . This poses an obstacle to the "rule, learn, update" model since it relies heavily on the ability of citizens to place themselves and the Supreme Court on a common unidimensional ideological scale.
The mapping of ideology along a single continuum is a non-trivial issue. Approximately 30-40% of respondents in the American National Election Survey (ANES) have traditionally labeled themselves as "moderates" (Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2012a) . It is difficult to know whether these citizens are truly moderates or whether they hold other ideological views but label themselves as moderates for the sake of convenience. Generally, in studies on ideology among the American people, it is hard to find evidence to support the assumption that citizens are sufficiently adept at using ideological criteria to be able to evaluate the Supreme Court's -12-legitimacy. The lessons that Treier and Hillygus (2009, 697-698) ruling. Generally, we seek to estimate the proportion of the American people that can reasonably be said to meet the various requirements of the ideological updating model.
The Survey Data
We base our analysis on data from The American Panel Survey (TAPS), a monthly online survey of up to 2,000 people, modeled on the KN KnowledgePanel. Panelists were first recruited as a national probability sample with an address-based sampling frame in the fall of 2011 by
Knowledge Networks for the Weidenbaum Center at Washington University. Individuals without internet access were provided a laptop and internet service at the expense of the Weidenbaum Center. Like the KnowledgePanel, the compound response rate for any given survey is difficult to calculate but is undoubtedly low (typically in the single digits). More technical information about the survey is available at taps.wustl.edu.
In our empirical analysis, we focus on TAPS respondents from three adjacent waves conducted around the Supreme Court ruling on the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on June 28 th , 2012. The surveys were conducted in May (wave 1: 1,511 respondents 7 ), June (wave 2: 1,475 respondents), and July (wave 3: 1,458 respondents). 8 In order to guarantee that all analyses are 7 All the Ns we report in this section are unweighted. 8 The full sample in wave 3 included 1,712 respondents but 254 of these were first-time respondents included in the panel as part of the first replenishment conducted by TAPS. Given the nature of our study, we naturally exclude them from all of our analyses.
based on the same respondents, we restrict our study to the subset of 1,363 respondents who answered all three waves.
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Although commonly used in studies with panel data, this empirical strategy raises concerns about attrition. We address this issue in Appendix A, in which we demonstrate that non-respondents in wave 3 (July) do not differ in any substantively relevant way from those wave 1 panelists who responded in wave 3.
Analytical Strategy
The empirical objective of this paper is to determine whether the assumptions of the ideological updating model square with the attributes of the American people. We therefore identify several specific tests, and use the TAPS data to determine the percentage of the sample able to satisfy the model's requirements on each of the tests. In the end, we cumulate these results so as to be able 9 All of the data in this paper are drawn from waves 1 and 3. The May survey was conducted prior to the Court's ruling; the July survey, after the Court's ruling. The June survey (wave 2) was conducted during the run-up to the ruling, and, for a relatively small number of respondents, after the Court had ruled. We believe the cleanest way to test the conditions under which the ideological updating model apply is to use data prior to and after the ruling. Because other scholars are examining this database (e.g., Gibson 2015), we add as a criterion for inclusion in our study completion of the June (wave 2) interview, resulting in an N of 1,363
respondents (which we hope becomes the standard for analyses of these data).
to draw an overall conclusion about the utility of the model. Following Johnston, Hillygus, and Bartels (2014), we also take one additional step to try to determine the types of respondents able to perform ideological updating, using (loosely) the Elaboration Likelihood Model (see Petty, and Cacioppo 1986) .
Testing the Model's Assumptions
The Basics of Ideological Distance
The first empirical question we must consider is whether the respondents in our sample are able to identify their own location on a unidimensional liberal-conservative continuum. The TAPS panelists were asked: "In terms of your political views, do you think of yourself as very liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate, slightly conservative, conservative, or very conservative?"
Recall that in the ANES surveys, somewhere around 20+ % of the respondents refuse to accept this continuum (Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2012a, 3) . In the TAPS data, however, the figure is 8.9%, which includes 8.7% of the respondents who said they did not know their own ideology and 0.3% who refused to answer the question.
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This much larger percentage of respondents accepting the self-categorization in the TAPS survey is no doubt a function of the experience of these respondents in answering earlier survey questions, including a wide variety of policy items and questions about their ideology. Semiprofessional respondents often differ from naïve respondents in many important ways (see 10 The failure of these figures to sum properly is due to rounding errors. 12 Moreover, the requirement of jointly locating oneself and the Court on a common unidimensional continuum cannot be satisfied for 24.3% of the sample. We reiterate that this figure is based on a unusually large percentage of the respondents able to score themselves on the liberal-conservative continuum.
11 Note that a "don't know" option was explicitly provided to the respondents.
12 Perhaps surprising is the finding that fully 61.3% (N = 119) of those who don't know where they stand on the continuum were nonetheless able to locate the Supreme Court. This finding seems to confirm the suspicion that the respondents are using some other sort of alternative continuum to classify themselves, and, as a consequence, no common ideological space jointly contains the Court and the individual.
Policy Opinionation
One might imagine that practically all Americans hold a view on Obamacare. The TAPS data suggest otherwise. When asked "Do you approve or disapprove of the requirement that every
American must buy health insurance or pay a fine?", 14.5% of the sample was unable to offer an opinion. If respondents hold no view on an issue before the Supreme Court it does not seem that a Court ruling on that issue can affect their judgments of the institution, one way or the other.
Mapping Healthcare Preferences Onto the Liberal-Conservative Continuum
The ideological updating model assumes that people can readily understand whether a Supreme Court decision is liberal or conservative. After encoding the Court's new policy decisions, people are able to reassess the ideological location of the Court. Most would surely assume that a decision in favor of government-sponsored healthcare is a liberal decision. So, the model assumes that a conservative would understand the Court's ruling as a liberal decision; would therefore conclude that the Court has become a more liberal institution 13 ; then recalculate the distance between herself and the institution; and adjust legitimacy accordingly.
TAPS did not ask the respondents whether the Court's decision on Obamacare was a liberal or conservative decision so no direct means of assessing the model's fit with public views of the decision is possible. It is possible, however, to determine how well the issue of healthcare 13 Of course, for some conservatives, the decision would merely confirm that the Court is a liberal institution, making no reassessment of the Court's position necessary.
-18-fits with the ideological predispositions of the people. Is it in fact the case that conservatives routinely oppose Obamacare and liberals uniformly support it?
14 Figure 1 provides the data necessary to assess this possibility. Because a non-trivial number of respondents was unable to form a view on Obamacare (as we have just noted), the percentage of people supporting the law is not the mirror obverse of the percentage opposing the law. We therefore report both support and opposition in Figure 1 .
[PLACE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The data reveal that those who are "very conservative" fit the ideological updating model quite well, with nearly all of these people opposing Obamacare. At the opposite extreme, however, the model seems to breakdown among those who are "very liberal" inasmuch as the percentages supporting and opposing the law are roughly the same. Across the three degrees of liberalism, more than one-third of the respondents oppose Obamacare. Generally, there is a 14 Christenson and Glick argue that the Court's decision on Obamacare was difficult to categorize because it included both liberal and conservative components (2015, 409) . Thus, they focus on subjective assessments of the Court's location without regard to whether people understood the decision as favoring any particular ideological preference. In their model, conservatives could easily view the Court as moving to the right as a result of the decision and therefore increase their support for the Court. Indeed, because the model relies upon subjective perceptions and classifications, virtually any movement is compatible with the theory (as we discuss in more detail below). 
The Court Decision as the Causal Agent
If we apply three criteria to the respondents -that they are able to locate themselves and the Court on the liberal-conservative continuum and that they hold an opinion on healthcare -we find that 33.4% of the sample does not meet the requirements of the ideological updating model.
It remains to determine, however, whether the requirement that one knows how the Court ruled on the case is widely satisfied.
As we noted above, some public opinion scholars are reluctant to assume that the facts of political life readily penetrate the consciousness of the American people. This same skepticism can be applied to Supreme Court pronouncements, even on issues that should be highly salient.
Thus, the next portion of our analysis asks whether the American people were aware of the Court's decision and understood its policy position.
TAPS asked the respondents:
The Supreme Court ruled on whether it is constitutional to require Americans to have health insurance. Do you know how the Court ruled on that issue?
[For those who answered yes] According to the Supreme Court, is the requirement that Americans have health insurance or pay a penalty constitutional or unconstitutional?
These two questions, although slightly awkward in their format, allow us to derive two figures:
more difficult time than do reporters.
the percentage of the sample aware that the Court had ruled on the issue and the percentage who correctly understood that the Court had ruled the law constitutional.
We derived our estimate of knowledge that the Court had ruled from those who said they did not know on the first question and those, while claiming to know "how the Court ruled on that issue" were nonetheless unable to answer the follow-up question on the nature of the Court's ruling. From these two questions, we determined that about one-third of the respondents (33.8%)
were unaware that the Court had ruled in the case. This is not surprising inasmuch public opinion research routinely reports widespread inattentiveness to even the most dramatic political events.
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The follow-up question asked the respondents how the Court ruled in the case. A total of 56.9% of the sample -which includes those unaware that the Court had ruled in the denominator -correctly asserted that the Court found the law constitutional; 43.1% did not. 18 The respondents could simply have searched the internet for the answers to the TAPS questions while they were completing the interview. Internet surveys generally over-estimate 
Holding Views on the Supreme Court's Legitimacy
Crucial to the ideological updating model is the dependent variable -institutional support for the U.S. Supreme Court. The indicators of support are typically asked with a Likert response set that includes some sort of center category (such as "uncertain" or "neither agree nor disagree").
Because that center category can be scored on an ordinal/interval response scale, those giving these "don't know" responses do not get excluded from the resulting index of support.
It turns out, however, that 7.5% of the respondents provided a "don't know" answer to all six of the indicators of diffuse support. 20 From the point-of-view of the ideological updating true levels of political knowledge. Our analysis also makes no correction for the possibility that some respondents were simply guessing in providing their answers.
19 As political scientists have long noted (e.g., Kuklinski et al. 2000) , citizens often make important decisions on the basis of information they believe to be true but that is unequivocally false.
20 Care must be taken with the TAPS data, as with all data sets relying on semi-model, these folks seem to have no attitude to update -they have no substantive views toward the Supreme Court's legitimacy, one way or the other. Without an opinion to update, the model cannot apply.
21

Summing Up
The foregoing analysis has reported what are essentially a series of bivariate tests of the updating model. Obviously, one cannot assume that each test is independent of the others, so that the percentages passing or failing the tests can be easily summed. We therefore present the results of each test and the cumulative "pass" rate, under two different conditions, in Table 1. professional respondents who (a) agree to be questioned repeatedly over months and years, and (Fb) learn from their experience how to engage in satisficing behavior when answering surveys.
Semi-professional respondents learn that there are no consequences of answering questions with a "don't know" reply, or even not answering questions at all. RDD samples typically report considerably fewer "don't know" responses, although some analysts believe that this is a function of social desirability pressures that mitigate against admitting ignorance to a live interviewer. 21 Although the data are insufficient to assess whether updating could actually take place in July, after the Court's decision, we do note that the legitimacy questions were asked in wave 3. A total of 11.6% of the respondents, a larger percentage than in wave 1, gave "don't know" answers to all 6 legitimacy items in wave 3.
-24-[PLACE 
The Attributes of Those Available to Update Their Views
Finally, we know from decades of research that not all citizens are susceptible to updating their views. According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (e.g., Zaller 1992), two conditions are necessary for attitudes to change. First, there must be exposure to an exogenous factor -in this case, a ruling by the Supreme Court. Second, the attitudes under consideration must be malleable. The problem for attitude change is that those with the least malleable attitudes are those most likely to be attentive to the rulings of the Supreme Court. This in turn has given rise to the conventional curvilinear hypothesis that change is most likely in the Goldilocks zonethose who have a moderate level of attentiveness and moderately malleable attitudes -and that change in attitudes is unlikely at the two extremes. This is the hypothesis that Johnston, Hillygus,
and Bartels (2014) tested in the context of the Affordable Health Care litigation.
As the final step in our investigation of the plausibility of the ideological updating model, we consider the percentage of those passing these earlier tests on ideology and awareness who are likely to be susceptible to attitude change. Our filtering of the data so far mainly addresses -26-the lower end of the distribution -those unlikely to be exposed to a Court decision. We therefore ask whether those passing all of these tests hold attitudes so entrenched that they are unlikely to change as a result of a Supreme Court decision. 23 As a simple test of this notion, we consider the percentage of Court legitimacy responses for which the respondent gave a "strongly" replyeither "agree strongly" or "disagree strongly" -as an indicator of attitude crystallization and hence resistance to change.
Of the 50.8% of the sample passing all of the tests without an accuracy requirement, 6.5% issued six "strongly" answers to the Supreme Court measures and another 11.1% gave five "strongly" answers. Of the 43.7% also passing the accuracy test, 6.7% gave six "strongly" replies and 11.8% gave five such replies. Thus, from the summary figures reported in Table 1 (above), one might subtract another 8 or so percentage points 24 , which, of course, lowers our estimate of the percentage of Americans capable of updating their views toward Supreme Court legitimacy to roughly four in ten. With the requirement that citizens must understand how the Court actually ruled, nearly two-thirds of the American people seem to be disqualified from ideological 23 We note that Bartels, Johnston, and Mark (2015, 791) have shown that ideological disagreement with the Court does not undermine the institution's legitimacy among legal elites, presumably because attitudes within this group are highly crystallized.
24 About 18% of the one-half of the sample passing the tests hold crystallized attitudes.
However, if we were to add attitude crystallization to Table 1 , it would be necessary to use the total sample as the denominator, not the one-half of the sample passing the tests. updating because they are unaware of Court decisions, do not use the liberal-conservative ideological continuum, or hold such strong attitudes toward the Court that they are unlikely to be affected by Court decisions, one way or the other.
Beyond our audit of the basic assumptions of the ideological updating model are four additional issues, none of which directly affect our empirical estimates, but all of which provide some context for our findings.
Updating Must be Done Continuously
Although it is beyond the limits of the available data, we simply note that the updating model assumes that citizens can undertake this complicated process at least twice -before and after a Supreme Court ruling. It seems unlikely that 100% of those who pass the tests once are able to pass them a second time (see footnote 21, above). 25 Indeed, were one to think of this as a truly dynamic process taking place, let us say, across an entire Supreme Court term, including multiple salient decisions, then the model's requirements of ordinary citizens become even more demanding and less realistic. 25 We acknowledge that some Supreme Court decisions may actually create opinions for some citizens where they previously had none. It is unclear to us, however, how these newly created opinions affect the process of updating.
Accounting for Findings of Ideological Updating
Our argument is not that no citizens engage in ideological updating; instead, we contend that the proportion of the American population able to do so is relatively small and therefore that a supplemental model of updating is necessary. Still, extant literature seems to have documented this updating process. Is there a way to reconcile the arguments of this paper with the findings of extant research?
Although a full exegesis of our concerns about extant findings is well beyond the scope of this paper, we offer several observations. (1) Some of these findings have been directly challenged -e.g., Gibson and Nelson (2015a) contest the findings of Bartels and Johnston (2013) and Gibson and Nelson 2015b assert that the findings of Christenson and Glick (2015) are frail.
(2) Some earlier research (e.g., Christenson and Glick) is based upon opt-in samples (e.g., MTurk) strongly biased in favor of highly politically knowledgeable individuals. As we have noted, we have no doubt that political sophisticates can engage in ideological updating. Whether these findings generalize to representative samples is entirely unclear. (3) Some research seems to solve the problems we raise here by simply excluding respondents from their analysis. That is, if respondents without ideological identifications, who are unable to locate the Court in ideological space, and who have never heard that the Court has ruled on an issue are excluded from the analysis, then in fact it is possible that the remaining portion of the sample is capable of engaging in ideological updating. (4) Scholars definitely disagree about whether coefficients/effects should be understood as small, medium, or large, but it is possible that there is no conflict at all between our contentions in this paper and the findings of earlier research. If only a minority of respondents engage in ideological updating, with the majority judging the Court on other criteria, then the correlation between ideological dissatisfaction and legitimacy should not be zero, but should be relatively weak. Some evidence that this is so exists. 26 (5) If the ideological updating model is correct and useful, then efforts to understand its micro-level mechanisms are essential.
Is Policy Updating A Superior Model of Public Opinion?
We have implied at several points that a policy-based approach to specific support is easier to imagine than an approach based on ideological updating. At the simplest level, if we were to remove two factors from our audit of the assumptions of the ideological model-whether the respondents could locate themselves and the Supreme Court on the liberal-conservative ideological continuum -the plausibility of the model would obviously improve.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct a thorough empirical comparison of policy updating and ideological updating. However, Gibson (2015) reports a revealing re-analysis of some of the Bartels and Johnston (2013) Thus, when preferences in the case are derived from ideology, only for self-described "liberals"
is there a statistically significant difference in legitimacy between those getting a Supreme Court decision they wanted and those getting a decision they opposed.
In Table 5 In three of the four comparisons, a statistically significant difference exists between winners and losers, when winning is defined by policy preferences rather than ideology. Thus, based on -32-ideology, the legitimacy scores of 126 respondents out of 1,037 (12.2%) seemed to be affected by the Court's ruling, as compared to the 664 out of 1,046 (63.5%) respondents having their legitimacy scores affected based on the satisfaction of their policy preferences. The effect of policy dissatisfaction on institutional legitimacy seems to be considerably greater than is the effect of ideological dissatisfaction.
A Brief Note on Experimental Research Designs
All who work on public reactions to Supreme Court decisions understand that the "learn" part of the model is quite demanding. Of course, in the laboratory, we can force this process on respondents. We can tell them about a Supreme Court decision, so that 100% of the sample learns there is a Court ruling. And we can then instruct them to update their views of the Court.
That is the research design used in some prominent studies (e.g., Bartels and Johnston 2013; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005) .
The external validity of this sort of experiment is low in many senses, however, ranging from the failure to acknowledge selective attention to particular policy areas to selective awareness of any given Supreme Court decision to positing a process of updating attitudes outside the context of any elite cues or discussion and deliberation. It seems likely that any effect observed in the artificial laboratory context represents the maximum possible influence of the intervention (the ruling) and that, in nature, the influence of such an intervention on the -33-population as a whole is dramatically smaller. 27 We agree with the thoughts of Christenson and Glick (2015, 416) on this point:
Thus, while portraying the Court as "not different" from other institutions affects legitimacy, real events of this nature are rare and even when they do happen, few people are naturally exposed to the details. All of this suggest that while seeing the Court in a strategic and political light can undermine legitimacy, this mechanism is rarely actually activated, which further contributes to stability [in the Court's legitimacy].
Discussion and Concluding Thoughts
These simple findings present some significant challenges to the "rule, A simpler way to understand this process it to take one step back in the model and to posit that citizens evaluate Court opinions, when they learn of them, in terms of whether they like the opinion or dislike it (a sort of a "likeability heuristic"). Some may use ideological criteria in this assessment process; others may use simple group benefits -"is the opinion good for groups with which I identify?" (e.g., public unions). Still another group may do nothing more than take cues from respected opinion leaders -"does the church tell us that it is a good decision?" Under the best of circumstances, the Supreme Court is not a highly salient institution.
To expect citizens to conduct their assessments of the Court in the way that a judicial politics scholar might is to expect too much of the American mass public.
-35-Our purpose in this paper has been limited. We have simply asked whether the microlevel mechanisms assumed by the ideological updating model fit the empirical reality of the American mass public. We find that, by and large, the assumptions do not square with the data.
Were they to fit, additional questions about the updating process would still need to be answered (see, for example, Gibson and Nelson 2015a, 2015b) . Because the fit is so poor, we conclude that the model seems to have limited utility for understanding how the Supreme Court and its constituents interact. 
* The percentages are based on the 1,334 respondents who answered all three waves of the TAPS survey and sum to 100% across columns (except for rounding errors). The data are weighted by post-stratification May weights with internet adjustment. The numbers of respondents are shown in parentheses. After each criterion, the source (month) of the TAPS survey is shown. Kendall's tau-b = .378 (p < .000) "Approving" represents the percentage of respondents within a given ideological group (i.e. "Very liberal") who chose "approve" or "approve strongly" when asked: Do you approve or disapprove of the requirement that every American must buy health insurance or pay a fine? "Disapproving" represents the percent of respondents within a given ideological group who chose "disapprove" or "disapprove strongly" when asked the question. The numbers in these two figures do not add to 100% owing to those without an opinion on the law. The dashed line represents the 50% threshold.
pattern for the main variables of interest persists with the inclusion of demographic variables.
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Thus, it seems unlikely that panel attrition has any substantive impact on our analysis.
A final issue concerns whether respondents with missing data on the three variables of interest participated at the same rate in wave 3 as those without missing data. We created dichotomies for the three main variables indicating whether a valid response was given to the question or not. Of course, because there is no missing data on these variables, the number of cases available for analysis is 1,511. None of the three variables displays a statistically significant relationship with participation in wave 3.
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29 We note that whether one is a Hispanic is itself statistically significant, which of course means that the average level of participation in wave 3 for Hispanics is lower than that of nonHispanics. However, this finding does not affect our conclusions about the substantive variables of interest in our research. Notes: the data are weighted by the post-stratification May weights with internet adjustment. b = unstandardized regression coefficient from a logistic regression with wave 3 participation as the outcome variable; s.e. = standard error of unstandardized regression coefficient; p = statistical significance of the regression coefficient; -2*Log-Likelihood = measure of fit for nested models. Smaller values are associated with an improvement in model fit.
